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Abstract
Background: The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a major pay-for-performance programme, was introduced into
United Kingdom primary care in April 2004. The impact of this programme on disparities in health care remains unclear. This
study examines the following questions: has this pay for performance programme improved the quality of care for coronary
heart disease, stroke and hypertension in white, black and south Asian patients? Has this programme reduced disparities in
the quality of care between these ethnic groups? Did general practices with different baseline performance respond
differently to this programme?
Methodology/Principal Findings: Retrospective cohort study of patients registered with family practices in Wandsworth,
London during 2007. Segmented regression analysis of interrupted time series was used to take into account the previous
time trend. Primary outcome measures were mean systolic and diastolic blood pressure, and cholesterol levels. Our findings
suggest that the implementation of QOF resulted in significant short term improvements in blood pressure control. The
magnitude of benefit varied between ethnic groups with a statistically significant short term reduction in systolic BP in
white and black but not in south Asian patients with hypertension. Disparities in risk factor control were attenuated only on
few measures and largely remained intact at the end of the study period.
Conclusions/Significance: Pay for performance programmes such as the QOF in the UK should set challenging but
achievable targets. Specific targets aimed at reducing ethnic disparities in health care may also be needed.
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Introduction
The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a major pay for
performance programme, was introduced into United Kingdom
(UK) primary care as part of a new General Practitioner (GP)
contract in April 2004. The Framework accounts for approxi-
mately one-quarter of a general practice’s income [1]. Before the
introduction of QOF, most British family doctors were earning a
large proportion of their income from capitation payments. This
system rewarded family doctors for having a large list of registered
patients rather than for the quality of care that they provided [2].
The QOF aims to improve and standardise the quality of primary
care and places considerable emphasis on the secondary prevention
ofcardiovasculardisease.Asa result,QOFisalsoconsidered to have
an impact on health care disparities [3]. Clinical quality indicators
include the presence of disease registers and standards for the
processesof: diagnosis and investigation,referral,clinicalmonitoring
and review, recording and management of risk factors for
complications, and treatment and control of risk factors and disease.
Previous literature suggests that physicians may respond to
financial incentives but there are also other relevant issues such as
their intrinsic motivation [4,5,6]. Prior research on the effect of
QOF on patients with chronic diseases such as stroke, coronary
heart disease and hypertension has not generally taken into
account the previous time trends or used patient level data [7].
Campbell et al found that the QOF was associated with
accelerated aggregate improvements in diabetes and asthma (but
not CHD) management but that these improvements were not
sustained over time [8]. However, there remains limited definitive
information about the impact of the QOF on practice and patient
level disparities in care [9]. We investigated the following research
questions: has this pay for performance programme resulted in a
step change in the quality of care for coronary heart disease, stroke
and hypertension in white, black and south Asian patients? Has
this programme reduce disparities in the quality of care for these
conditions between these ethnic groups? Did general practices
with different baseline performance respond differently to this
programme?
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Setting and patients
Data used in this study were extracted from a longitudinal
primary care record of 220,743 patients registered with 29 family
practices in Wandsworth, south London during 2007. The
population of Wandsworth is younger than that of England as a
whole, with 74% aged,45 years (compared with a national
average of 60%). Approximately one in five Wandsworth residents
(22%) belong to a minority ethnic group. Of these, 8.8% are black
(African or Caribbean) and 4.4% are south Asian (Indian,
Pakistani, Bangladeshi). Wandsworth also has a higher than
average level of income disparity.
For the purpose of this study, we examined quality of care in all
adult patients ($18 years) diagnosed with stroke, coronary heart
disease or hypertension. Patients registered with practices in 2007
with these conditions were identified using an established method
which involves searching both diagnostic and management Read
and OXMIS codes [10]. Read codes are the clinical classification
system used in primary care in the UK; OXMIS codes were used
in the past by some general practices but have now been replaced
by Read codes. We excluded patients with incorrect data entry
and those missing ethnicity coding (13.5% in stroke cohort, 8.1%
in CHD cohort, 12.8% in hypertension cohort).
This study was approved by the Wandsworth Local Research
Ethics Committee. The committee gave approval for the data to
be extracted and analysed without individual patient consent
because no patient identifiers were included in the dataset and as
such it was anonymised.
See table 1 for the descriptive statistics for patient demographic
characteristics.
Study variables
The primary outcome measures were mean systolic and
diastolic blood pressure and total cholesterol. Each indicator
was based on last recorded measurement each year in the
electronic record. Our main explanatory variable was ethnicity.
Information on ethnic background in primary care is collected
from patients during registration, or during the consultation
process, using the 2001 UK census classification. Due to small
numbers in some of the ethnic groups, we grouped patients into
three main categories: white, black, and south Asian. Covariates
in the analysis included age, gender, socio-economic status and
number of comorbid medical conditions. We assigned socioeco-
nomic status to individual patients based on the postcode of their
practice using the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004. The index
of Multiple Deprivation is the most commonly used method of
measuring neighbourhood socioeconomic status in the UK and is
compiled from a variety of sources, including the 2001 UK
census, unemployment, and social security benefit records. We
identified additional co-morbid conditions using Read codes in
the medical record: asthma, diabetes, depression, heart failure,
hypertension, atrial fibrillation, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, adrenal disease.
Statistical methods
As previous literature suggests some aspects of patients’ health
care were already improving before the implementation of pay for
performance in UK primary care [11], segmented regression
analysis of interrupted time series was used to take into account the
previous time trend. This method has recently been widely used in
health policy evaluation [8,12,13].
Taking into account the multilevel nature of the data (patients
being observed many times in the panel, and patients nested at the
practice level), a mixed effect multilevel model with two random
intercepts was adopted. The model Specification is the following:
yijt~B0zB1timeijtzB2policyijtzB3years after policyijtz
B4Xijtzvizujzeijt
Where vi,uj are random intercept for practice level and patient
level and are assumed to be independently distributed from the
residual error eijt. B1 estimates the average change in the outcome
measures that occur each year during the study period. B2
estimates the level change in outcome measures immediately after
policy (in year 2005). B3 estimates the average change in outcome
measures in the years after QOF was introduced (2005–2007). B4
is the vector of estimates corresponding to the vector of covariates
that are used to control for patients’ heterogeneity. We use the
bootstrap method with 2000 replications to estimate the standard
error of parameter estimates.
We examined whether the differential effect of QOF for general
practices with different baseline performance prior to the
implementation of the policy. As some studies have suggested
that the differential effect of QOF by practices’ with different
baseline performance, particularly the worst performers improved
at the fastest rate after QOF [14,15]. For this analysis, we created
3 approximately equal-sized number of GP practices groups based
on their baseline performance in year 2003 for each indicator. The
same analysis as mentioned before was adopted to examine the
differential effect of QOF on clinics with different baseline
performance.
This study also investigates whether this pay for performance
program reduced disparities among patients in different ethnic
groups. We compare differences in blood pressure and cholesterol
control between ethnic groups before (year 2003, the year before
QOF was introduced) and after (year 2007, the final year of our
study) using analysis of covariance (ANOCOVA). For this model,
a linear model was adopted which adjusted for age, gender,
deprivation, duration of illness, number of co-morbidities and
clustering at practice level.
The dataset consists of the historical records (2000–2007) of
patients registered with practices in 2007. Some patients might not
Table 1. Patient characteristics in 2007.
CHD Stroke Hypertension
Gender Male 63.07% 51.01% 43.59%
Female 36.93% 48.99% 56.41%
Ethnicity Black 9.57% 18.73% 26.26%
South Asian 20.52% 11.86% 13.18%
White 69.19% 68.78% 59.65%
Age group 18–45 1.25% 6.48% 7.66%
45–54 6.13% 5.90% 13.08%
55–64 18.63% 16.50% 22.77%
65–74 33.70% 27.66% 28.30%
over 75 40.29% 43.46% 28.20%
Co-morbidity no co-morbidity 17.95% 15.45% 44.08%
One co-morbidity 33.53% 31.90% 30.20%
Two co-morbidities
or more
48.52% 52.66% 25.72%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027236.t001
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capture information on patients with cardiovascular conditions
registered with practices during the study period who moved away
or died prior to 2007. For example, 71.1% of CHD patients,
61.1% of stroke patients, and 63.8% of hypertension patients have
complete record from throughout the study period). To compen-
sate for this, we conducted sensitivity analysis using imputation
method and Heckman sample selection model (results in Appendix
S1) and compare these results to those from the main analysis.
To increase the power to detect significant predictors of the
outcome, the results showed the most parsimonious model which
excludes the covariates which are not significant through step-wise
back elimination. The standard error was calculated using
bootstrapping method with 2000 replications. Statistical analyses
were undertaken using STATA version 11.
Results
Our final sample contained 1753 patients with stroke, 2952
patients with coronary heart disease and 15,035 patients with
hypertension. In 2007, the mean age of patients with CHD was
68.3 years, 66.9 years for stroke patients and 65.8 years for
hypertension. In the CHD cohort, 68.0% were white, 9.8% were
black and 21.3% were south Asian. In the stroke cohort, 68.8% of
patients were white, 18.5% were black and 11.9% were south
Asian. In the hypertension cohort, 59.6% were white, 25.9% were
black and 13.6% were south Asian. The average number of co-
morbidities for patients with the CHD was 1.2, 1.7 for patients
with stroke and 1.0 for the hypertension cohort in 2007. The
average duration of illness for CHD is 11.0 years, 9.8 years for
stroke, and 9.9 for the hypertension. Trends in mean blood
pressure and cholesterol over the study period are presented in
Figures 1, 2. The results for the interrupted time series analyses are
presented in Table 2.
Systolic and diastolic blood pressure
CHD Cohort. The baseline trend suggests that systolic blood
pressure was decreasing significantly in white patients (0.8 mm Hg
per year), but not in black and south Asian patients, with CHD
before the introduction of QOF. Diastolic blood pressure was
decreasing in all three groups before the introduction of QOF.
There was no significant level change in systolic or diastolic blood
pressure suggesting that the introduction of QOF did not have an
immediate beneficial impact on mean blood pressure control. The
trend change for systolic blood pressure suggested a significant
reduction during the post-QOF period which exceeded the pre-
QOF period among south Asian (1.8 mm Hg per year) but not
white or black patients. The trend change for diastolic blood
pressure suggested a significant increase during the post-QOF
period which exceeded the pre-QOF period among south Asian
(0.9 mm Hg per year). There was no significant change in white or
black patients.
Stroke Cohort. The baseline trend suggests that systolic
blood pressure was not decreasing in any group before the
introduction of QOF. Conversely, diastolic blood pressure was
decreasing significantly in all three groups during this period.
There was no significant initial level change in systolic blood
pressure in any group. The results for initial level change in
diastolic blood pressure suggested that south Asian patients
experienced a significant immediate increase (4.2 mm Hg) after
the introduction of QOF but there no significant changes among
white or black patients. The trend change for systolic blood
pressure suggested a significant reduction among white patients
(1.1 mm Hg per year) but no change in black or south Asian
patients. The trend change for diastolic blood pressure suggested a
significant increase among south Asian patients (2.0 mm Hg per
year) but no change in black or white patients.
Hypertension Cohort. The baseline trend suggests that
systolic blood pressure was decreasing significantly in white
Figure 1. Trends in mean systolic/diastolic blood pressure in patients with CHD, stroke and hypertension.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027236.g001
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patients but not black patients prior to the introduction of QOF.
Diastolic blood pressure was decreasing in all three groups during
this period. The level change suggested a significant reduction in
systolic and diastolic blood pressure in white and black patients,
but not south Asian patients, associated with the introduction of
QOF. The trend change suggested that there were sustained
reductions in systolic blood pressure in all three ethnic groups in
the post-QOF period when compared to the pre-QOF period.
The trend change for diastolic blood pressure suggested a
significant increase among south Asian patients (0.7 mm Hg per
year) but no change in black or white patients.
Total cholesterol
CHD Cohort. The baseline trend suggests that total cho-
lesterol was decreasing significantly in all ethnic groups before the
introduction of QOF. The results for level changes in each ethnic
group did not reach statistical significance. The trend change for
total cholesterol suggested a significant decrease among black
patients (0.1 mmol/L per year) but no change in south Asian or
white patients during the post-QOF period.
Stroke Cohort. The baseline trend suggests that total
cholesterol was decreasing significantly in white patients but not
in black or south Asian patients prior to the introduction of QOF.
There were no statistically significant reductions in the level or
trend change in any ethnic group.
Trends in mean blood pressure and cholesterol over the study
period in are presented in Figures 1a, b.
The results for the effect of QOF on practices with different
baseline performance (table 3) suggest that the largest effects of
QOF were in the practices with the worst baseline performance.
The effect of QOF is very small, even negative, for practices with
higher performance in 2003. The coefficient for previous time
trends is larger for practices with a better baseline performance,
which suggest they had already improved their quality even before
the implementation of QOF. As a result of this, the QOF has a
very small effect on these practices.
Disparities in blood pressure and cholesterol control between
ethnic groups before QOF (2003) and at the end of the study
period (2007) for the three conditions is shown in table 4.
Throughout the study period black patients had highest mean
systolic, diastolic blood pressure and cholesterol level compared to
other groups. The magnitude of the disparity in risk factor control
were attenuated only on few measures (such as systolic and
diastolic blood pressure for black patients with hypertension) and
largely remained intact at the end of the study period.
To address the potential attrition bias of the dataset, we have
applied two methods (LOCF and Heckman sample selection
model) in the sensitivity analysis. The results in sensitivity analysis
are similar to those from our main analysis and suggest that they
are robust (see appendix table S1 and S2).
Discussion
By using interrupted time series, we were able to take into
account the previous time trends in quality improvement and to
identify the impact of QOF on disparities in intermediate health
outcomes. Previous research has examined the overall effect of
QOF [7,16,17,18], and also for specific disease areas: for example,
coronary heart disease [19,20,21], hypertension [19,21,22], stroke
[19,23] and diabetes [1,21,24,25,26]. Our findings are broadly
consistent with previous research which suggests that QOF was
associated with an initial step change improvement in the quality
of care but that these improvements appear to flatten out in
subsequent years although the pattern of improvement varied
between outcome measures. We found that disparities in risk
factor control were attenuated only on few measures and largely
remained intact at the end of the study period.
The impact of pay for performance on disparities in care is an
important concern for designers of these programmes and policy
makers [27,28]. Because QOF did not reward physicians more in
deprived areas, QOF might have perpetuated the inverse care law
[29,30,31]. However, QOF might also have had an effect in terms
of diminishing health care inequalities as collective achievement
Figure 2. Trends in mean total cholesterol in patients with CHD and stroke.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027236.g002
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the later years of the implementation of the policy. This
phenomenon has been termed the inverse equity hypothesis
[18,32]. Our findings provide some support for the latter
explanation as they suggest that the introduction of QOF was
associated with an attenuation of disparities in risk factor control
between ethnic groups and more rapid improvements in quality in
practices performing badly prior to the introduction of this pay for
performance programme. However, consistent with previous work
our findings suggest that clinically important differences in risk
factor control between ethnic groups have persisted three years
after the introduction of QOF [18,20,21,22,33].
Our study has several strengths and limitations. The key
strength of this study is that it utilises patient level longitudinal data
with near complete coverage of patients in the study area. In
addition, this study is also able to adjust for important patient
characteristics covariates and look at the effect of QOF on
disparities in intermediate health outcomes among different ethnic
groups. One of the limitations of the dataset is that it only includes
patients registered with practices in 2007 and we lack information
on those who died or moved away before this which may cause
attrition bias. To address this, we conducted sensitivity analysis
under the assumption of both missing at random as well as not at
random. These were results are consistent with those from the
main analysis which suggests that they are robust.
Another limitation of this study is relatively small sample size,
particularly for CHD and stroke, meant that some of our results
did not achieve statistical significance due to lack of power. The
Table 4. Ethnic Disparities by patients’ disease cohorts for each indicator.
Ethnicity Systolic Diastolic Cholesterol Value
2003 2007
Mean Difference
(95 %CI) 2003 2007
Mean Difference
(95 %CI) 2003 2007
Mean Difference
(95 %CI)
CHD White 137.6 132.8 24.8 (26.1, 23.6) 77.2 74.2 23.0 (23.7, 22.3) 4.7 4.4 20.3 (20.4, 20.3)
Black 141.5 138.1** 23.4 (27.1, 0.2) 79.5** 76.4** 23.1 (25.3, 0.8) 4.7 4.5 20.2 (20.4, 20.0)
South Asian 136.4 130.9 25.5 (27.9, 23.1) 75.9** 73.5** 22.5 (23.8, 21.1) 4.3** 4.1** 20.2 (20.4, 20.1)
All Group 137.8 132.9 24.8 (25.9, 23.8) 77.2 74.3 22.9 (23.5, 22.3) 4.7 4.3 20.3 (20.4, 20.3)
Stroke White 140.5 133.2 27.3 (29.1, 25.6) 78.9 75.5 23.4 (24.3, 22.5) 5.1 4.6 20.5 (20.6, 20.4)
Black 141.9 135.2** 26.8 (210.2, 23.4) 81.3** 77.4** 23.9 (25.9, 22.0) 4.7** 4.4 20.3 (20.5, 20.0)
South Asian 137.8 132.5 25.3 (29.9, 20.8) 76.7** 74.9 21.8 (24.2, 0.7) 4.7 4.2** 20.5 (20.8, 20.2)
All Group 140.4 133.5 26.9 (28.3, 25.4) 78.7 75.1 23.6 (24.7, 22.6) 5.0 4.5 20.5 (20.6, 20.4)
Hypertension White 143.7 138.1 25.7 (26.2, 25.1) 81.9 79.1 22.8 (23.2, 22.4)
Black 144.3** 138.2 26.1 (27.0, 25.1) 84.3** 81.1 23.3 (23.8, 22.7)
South Asian 140.8 135.1** 25.7 (27.1, 24.3) 81.1** 78.3** 22.7 (23.6, 21.9)
All Group 143.5 137.7 25.8 (26.3, 25.3) 82.5 79.5 22.9 (23.2, 22.7)
Notes:
Figures in the table are mean value.
**represents significantly different to white group after adjustment for age, gender, deprivation, duration of illness, number of co-morbidities and practice level
clustering at 5% level of significance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027236.t004
Table 3. Effect of QOF by different baseline performance GP clinics.
Systolic Diastolic Cholesterol Value
Upper Middle Lower Upper Middle Lower Upper Middle Lower
CHD Baseline Trend 21.03*** 0.35 21.08*** 21.90*** 21.15*** 20.03 20.10*** 20.13*** 20.06***
Level Change 0.48 21.39 22.01 1.49** 20.05 22.67*** 0.02 0.02 20.10
Trend Change 20.03 21.65*** 20.21 1.31*** 0.22 20.65** 0.04 0.06** 20.05
Stroke Baseline Trend 21.56 20.58 0.93 21.71*** 20.90*** 0.03 20.20*** 20.09 20.04
Level Change 20.94 20.05 25.19*** 1.28 20.15 23.01*** 0.19 20.10 20.43***
Trend Change 0.88 20.96 22.61*** 0.92** 0.14 20.55 0.08 20.03 20.01
Hypertension Baseline Trend 20.89*** 20.87*** 20.21 21.52*** 20.69*** 20.43***
Level Change 20.07 20.91 22.49*** 0.04 21.05*** 21.45***
Trend Change 20.23 20.84*** 21.53*** 0.82*** 20.25** 20.67***
Notes:
**at the 5% level and.
***at the 1% level. Wald test was used to test the significance of coefficients.
The first tertile for the clinics with the best baseline performance prior to QOF, the third tertile for the clinics with the worst baseline performance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027236.t003
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Based on the descriptive statistics and year by year analysis for the
outcome measures, it appears that most of the improvement in risk
factor control occurs early in the study period which means that
our analysis may have underestimated the effect of QOF.
Our model did not take autocorrelation in the patient-level into
account, instead we adopted a mixed effect model (with random
effect for both individual level and practice level) to adjust to
correlation of the error term within practices. Previous studies
have highlighted the importance of taking into account of the
correlation in the error term within the same practice [34,35].
Previous literature suggests that QOF has had an effect on
quality improvement for physicians in general; although there may
be little or no effect on physicians already achieving the target
before the implementation of the policy. Hence, some general
practices can achieve the targets without making any additional
efforts in improving quality. Rosenthal et al (2005) [36], by looking
at a pay-for-performance scheme in California, found that the
policy effect is smaller for physicians for those who have already
achieved higher performance at baseline compared to those who
have had a worse baseline performance. Therefore, they
concluded that paying clinicians to reach a common, fixed
performance target might produce little gain in quality for the
money spent and will largely reward those already operating at a
high performance at baseline. This is a particular worrying issue
with QOF since many family practices in the UK had already
attained high levels of achievement before the QOF was
introduced, which indicates that incentives may be too easy to
achieve for some practices [7]. Consequently, we may need to
implement more challenging targets while also taking into account
their cost-effectiveness [37,38].
Previous studies on the impacts of QOF have generally either
used a cross-sectional analysis or used practice level datasets [6].
Therefore, they did not take into account the previous time trends
before QOF was introduced or the individual heterogeneity of
patients with underlining health characteristics. These studies that
have taken into account both of these effects are Campbell et al
(2007, 2009) and Millett et al (2008) [8,35,39]. However, the
results of the first two studies may not be robust because the
authors used non-linear projected trajectories to disentangle the
previous time trend with the effect of QOF by using only two time
points before its implementation. Their analysis was also limited
to a relatively small selected sample of patients. The final study
examined the impact of QOF on the quality of diabetes mana-
gement only.
Conclusions
The results of the study suggest there is a significant positive
relationship between the implementation of QOF and risk factor
control in people with cardiovascular disease in primary care.
However, this effect is mainly attributed to the practices with a
worse baseline performance subsequently achieving QOF targets.
We found some attenuation of disparities but this was not true
across all outcome measures and ethnicities studied. Our findings
suggest that pay for performance programmes such as the QOF in
the UK should set challenging but achievable targets. Specific
targets aimed at reducing ethnic disparities in health may also be
needed.
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